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Abstract: 
Many studies deal with experimental investigation of rational behaviour, which might deviate 
from initial concepts under particular conditions, where subjects follow rather adaptive behaviour. 
The aim of this study is to verify whether adaptive behaviour might be prevalent in environment of 
nominal values characterized by uncertainty. Our hypothesis is verified with help of the experiment 
based on n-player pricing game with monopolistic competition and strategic complementarity inspired 
by experimental design of Fehr and Tyran, (2001), where players have to cope with environment of 
real or nominal values. Results confirm our initial assumption that in case of nominal treatment, 
subjects tend to behave rather in adaptive way, since the size of expectation correction is close to 
simulated case of adaptive player together with substantial deviation from equilibrium. On the other 
hand, subjects in the real treatment behave in less adaptive and even more rational way, where the size 
of expectation correction is far away from the case of adaptive player and deviation from equilibrium 
substantially smaller. Prevalence of adaptive players under the nominal treatment has also 
implications in terms of slower convergence to equilibrium at aggregate level, as opposed to the real 
treatment where more rational players are present. Furthermore, this is in line with our illustrative 
simulations carried out at economy´s level. 
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Introduction 
Many studies deal with analysis of rational and adaptive behavior on experimental basis under 
particular conditions, for instance Williams (1987), Marimon, Sunder (1988), Hey (1994), Van Huyck 
(1997) with recent resurrection in studies of Bornstein, (2004), Nagel, Grosskopf (2007), Terracol 
(2009) or Fehr and Tyran (2008). It was shown that subjects do not necessarily behave in line with 
game theoretic assumptions based on rationality, but may deviate as opposed to initial concepts and 
switch rather to adaptive behavior as emphasized by Nagel, Grosskopf (2007). This raises question 
under what conditions might individuals behave in adaptive or rational way. The main aim of this 
study is to evaluate behavior of players under two different environments and detect whether rational 
or adaptive behavior prevails in case of each treatment. Hypothesis will be examined with help of the 
experiment based on n-player pricing game with monopolistic competition and strategic 
complementarity inspired by experimental design of Fehr and Tyran, (2001), where players have to 
cope with environment of real or nominal values. We expect that in nominal treatment, subjects will 
tend to adaptive rather than rational behaviour due to the factor of uncertainty and also due to rational 
player´s conjectures about other players playing rather in adaptive way. In contrast, the real treatment 
should exhibit prevalently rational behaviour, since under the real frame subjects have no reason to 
behave adaptively and no reason to suppose that others will behave adaptively, since cognitive barrier 
related to nominal values is absent.  
First section outlines initial hypothesis followed by description of basic experimental design. 
The second section provides our simulations related to individual adaptive or rational behavior 
together with simulations at aggregate level, which provide support for results gained on the basis of 
experiment. The last section reveals experimental results which are in line with our initial 
expectations. 
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Hypothesis and Experimental Design 
We assume that if subjects face different environment related to their pricing strategy, they 
may exhibit different behavior. Under conditions of uncertainty, which require solution of cognitive 
task, we assume individuals to apply rather adaptive behavior, which is simply the best option. In 
other words, subjects under uncertainty consider rationality too costly, thereby they prefer to switch to 
adaptive behavior, which enables to collect at least average rewards with some certainty. This means 
that although only small number of adaptive individuals was present in environment of certainty, the 
share of adaptive individuals will significantly increase under uncertain environment. It is assumed 
that subjects, which would be rational under standard conditions, assess the situation in uncertain 
environment as untenable and switch to less costly adaptive behavior as emphasized by Smith (2002, 
2003). Moreover, they may doubt if others stay rational in this uncertain environment, which is 
another reason for the change in their behavior.  
In order to verify whether subjects tend to adaptive rather than rational behavior under 
uncertainty, hypothesis will be examined with help of the experiment based on n-player pricing game 
with monopolistic competition and strategic complementarity, (Fehr and Tyran, 2001). Individuals are 
setting prices, where returns are affected by their selling price and price level, determined by prices 
set by other firms in experimental economy. Subjects aim to maximize profits, defined as a function 
of their individual price and the average price level. Subjects are expected to select profit-maximizing 
price, which should be consistent with the total general equilibrium of the economy, if other subjects 
choose the correct price as well. The game has 40 rounds plus one trial period, with a group size of 
n=4. 80 subjects participated in the experiment, which was conducted in the Laboratory of 
Experimental Economics, University of Economics, Prague. Experiment is divided into a pre-shock 
and a post-shock phase. Fully anticipated negative monetary shock is implemented during the game, 
which is common knowledge to participants. 
In order to determine whether adaptive type of players are present in uncertain environment, 
treatment groups are endowed by different pay-off functions, which provide them with information 
about their pricing strategy. Experimental treatment is represented by subjects, which receive pay-off 
information in nominal terms, whereas control treatment by subjects which receive pay-off 
information in real terms. In order for subject in the nominal environment to decide correctly about 
the price of his product, he needs to re-count nominal pay-off into the real pay-off.  The nominal pay 
off is given by P-i. πi, therefore in order to compute real payoff, individuals have to divide their 
nominal payoffs P-i. πi by P-i. 
The real pay-off of subject i is given by: 
πi = πi (Pi, P-i, M)    i=1,.... n 
where Pi stands for nominal price, P-i is the average price of the other n-1 group members, and M is 
nominal shock variable. Subjects are informed about payoffs of other subjects in the group, since x 
and y types players are present in both treatments, (For more detailed specification of nominal and 
real payoffs see Fehr, Tyran (2000).  
Since experimental group of nominal treatment requires to make distinction between nominal and real 
values, its environment represents higher level of uncertainty compared to the real control treatment. 
This will enable to examine whether phenomenon of adaptive behaviour prevails in uncertain nominal 
environment, after fully anticipated negative monetary shock is implemented during the game.  
In experimental nominal treatment we expect behaviour, where majority players are presumed 
to be closer to the situation of adaptive player. Firstly, nominal frame plays the role, where subjects 
after the shock find themselves in uncertain situation ,unable to familiarize and rather switch to 
adaptive behaviour in order to minimize costs. But also strategic complementarity (Haltiwanger, 
Waldmann, 1989) contributes to the fact that even rational players switch to adaptive behaviour, since 
it is optimal for them. This is caused by the fact that they believe that others will not behave rationally 
under nominal frame as well and thus may maximize rewards better by joining suboptimal adaptive 
path of behaviour. This will be reflected in character of coordination, where the size of expectation 
correction will be close to zero after the negative shock and distance from the equilibrium after the 
shock will be rather substantial. Additionally, lower speed of the adjustment to equilibrium is 
expected at aggregate level, since coordination effort required in order to adjust adequately is slowed 
down by prevalence of backward-looking individuals.  
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In the real treatment, which serves as a control group, we assume that more players tend to the 
situation of rational player, since real values are directly available for subjects without the need to 
distinguish between nominal and real values, which significantly reduce the level of uncertainty.  Not 
only under the real frame more intensive expectation correction takes place, but also lower distance 
from the equilibrium after the shock is present under the real frame. We also predict that subjects on 
aggregate level will converge more quickly to economy’s equilibrium, since coordination effort is 
higher also due to the prevalence of rational subjects, which do not have any reason to consider 
behaviour of other subjects to be adaptive under the real frame.  
Simulations of Adaptive and Rational Behavior 
Basic simulations are addressed before discussion related to the main results of experiment. 
These simulations aim to introduce examples of representative behaviour of particular strategies 
(adaptive versus rational), which players follow in ideal cases with respect to artificial economy 
examined. As a result, it may provide a good benchmark in comparison with the real data gathered on 
experimental basis. In other words, we may evaluate easily, how closely the characteristic of players 
in our experimental economy is to the simulated case and thereby determine type of rational or 
adaptive player prevailed in particular treatment. Additionally, simulations may provide information 
regarding the speed of convergence in the economy, affected by the type of players prevailed. This 
may be further compared to the actual results gained.  
We have simulated the situation of experimental subjects from different games, which behave 
half in adaptive and half in rational way, (See Figure 1 below). It makes also distinction according to 
the type of player (x or y). Monetary shock is implemented in period 21, which is a common 
knowledge. The simulation shows that prices differ significantly in period of the shock, with regards 
to whether the player is adaptive or rational one. Player of type x1, who behaves in adaptive way, 
changes the price after the shock from 𝑃𝑖
∗ = 9 to 𝑃𝑖∗  = 16. In contrast, player x2 with rational 
expectations changes the price after the shock from 𝑃𝑖
∗  = 9 to 𝑃𝑖∗  = 3. Player y1 with adaptive 
expectations changes price from 𝑃𝑖
∗  = 27 to 𝑃𝑖∗  = 18 after the shock. Lastly, player y2 with rational 
expectations changes price from 𝑃𝑖
∗  = 27 to 𝑃𝑖∗  = 9. The adjustment to the equilibrium price is 
significantly slower for adaptive players after the shock and they converge only to equilibrium in the 
period 32. In contrast, rational players x2 and y1 head smoothly towards equilibrium immediately after 
the shock in period 21, since prices selected after the shock reflect equilibrium prices. In addition, 
behaviour of player x1 after the shock might seem to be non-standard, since the price increased. We 
would expect movement in direction of lower prices, which is exactly the behaviour of player y1 in the 
first period after the shock. However, the setting of pay-off table of player x implies that he should 
increase the price after the shock if he behaves in adaptive way with respect to the size of the average 
price in the economy given by experimental design above. 
  
Figure 1: Simulation of the Development of Prices for Adaptive and Rational Players from Different Games. 
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Expectations of adaptive player were computed as the average price of the other n-1 players in the 
pre-shock period, where prices of these other n-1 players are individual pre-shock equilibrium prices 
given by experimental design, since behaviour of naive adaptive player is delayed and based on prices 
of the previous pre-shock period. When getting values for type of x and type of y of adaptive player 
(the size of expectation correction is 0 for both types), the average size of expectation correction 
equals 0. Similarly, based on experimental design, we computed for the average deviation from 
equilibrium directly after the shock, which is 11 for adaptive player, (deviation for player x is 13, 
deviation for player y is 9 consecutively). 
Expectations of rational player were computed as the average price of other n-1 players in the 
post-shock period, where prices of other three players are their individual post-shock equilibrium 
prices, since he is no longer interested in the past price development. After getting values for type of x 
and type of y of rational player (the size of expectation correction is 14 and 10 consecutively), the size 
of expectation correction yields 12, which suggests that rational player adjusts substantially his 
expectations with immediate movement towards equilibrium after the shock. Similarly we computed 
for deviation of rational player from equilibrium directly after the shock, which is 0, (for player x 
deviation equals 0, for player y also 0). 
Till now, we have simulated individual behaviour of particular players, which may emerge in 
our economy. This individual behaviour may have serious implications for convergence at aggregate 
level, depending on type of the player prevailed. Therefore, we have also simulated two economies, 
where the first one is composed of two rational players (REx and REy) and two adaptive players (AEx 
and AEy) and the second one is purely adaptive economy (4AE), (See Figure 2 below). The 
adjustment to the equilibrium price is for the first economy significantly faster than for purely 
adaptive economy. Moreover, the inclusion of only two rational players is sufficient in order to ensure 
smooth and relatively fast adjustment to economy´s equilibrium. In contrast purely adaptive economy, 
which relies solely on backward-looking behaviour, is characterized by slow convergence to new 
equilibrium after the shock and converges in period 32. In contrast, the first economy converges in 
period 23, which is relatively fast adjustment if the share of rational and adaptive players is 
comparable. This suggests that smooth convergence might be achieved even in case of the economy, 
which consists only partly of rational players. 
  
Figure 2: Development of the Average Price in two economies: 2 RE, 2AE and pure AE 
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Results of Experiment 
Simulations above suggest that adaptive player in ideal case corrects expectations in no way in 
the first post-shock period and deviates by 11 directly after the shock, with consequent pricing path, 
which reflects only slow backward-looking adjustment to new equilibrium in following post-shock 
periods. On the other hand ideal rational player corrects expectations significantly by 12, with zero 
deviation from equilibrium directly after the shock, with relatively fast convergence towards 
equilibrium even in the first post-shock period. Based on simulations, this is reflected also on 
aggregate treatment´s level as illustrated above. Following section will reveal whether adaptive 
behaviour will be present under the nominal treatment with less frequent expectations correction and 
slow adjustment to equilibrium, compared to the control group of the real treatment, where subjects 
are assumed to be rather rational with substantial expectation correction and relatively fast adjustment 
to equilibrium. 
Following test enables to detect not only whether subjects follow rather adaptive behaviour in 
uncertain environment of the nominal treatment compared to the real one, but also whether they get 
acquainted with experimental instructions and whether they reflected this consistently into consequent 
behaviour. In other words, the aim is to evaluate how far subjects corrected their expectations about 
the price in the first post-shock period with consequent pricing strategy after the shock. This will be 
evaluated with help of the following regression: 
(𝑃𝑖  –𝑃∗)= α + β*(𝑃�−𝑖  –𝑃� −𝑖𝑒 ) + ε     (1) 
Where (𝑃�−𝑖  –𝑃� −𝑖𝑒 ) is deviation of player´s expectations for the post-shock period to the pre-
shock actual price level (i.e. the size of his expectations correction) and (𝑃𝑖   –𝑃∗) is distance of 
subject´s individual price from equilibrium in the first post-shock period. The coefficient β measures, 
how the size of expectations correction is reflected into consequent distance of the subject with his 
individual price from equilibrium. If the coefficient β=0, then the size of expectation correction has no 
effect on distance of the subject from equilibrium, which reflects non-consistency of decisions. If the 
coefficient β<0, then two situations may arise where the player is consistent with his decision-making. 
Either consistent adaptive player is the case, where the closer the expectations to the past pre-shock 
price, the higher the deviation of individual price from the optimum in the post-shock phase. Or 
consistent rational player is the case, where the higher the expectations correction, the lower is the 
deviation of individual price from the optimum in the post-shock phase. 
Based on simulations applied on the player of type x, the case of consistent adaptive player 
looks as follows: the past pre-shock average price was 𝑃�−𝑖 =9, where zero expectation correction takes 
place and thus expectations are in line or very close the past pre-shock average price, i.e. 𝑃�−𝑖  
=9=𝑃� −𝑖𝑒 . The equilibrium price, which reflects perfect adjustment for type of player x is however 
𝑃∗ = 3.  Difference between individual price and optimum is higher, the most inertial being (𝑃𝑖  –𝑃∗)=6, which is our simulated case. Similarly we would apply our considerations on player of 
type y. 
Behaviour of consistent rational is described as follows: high expectation correction takes 
place and therefore expectations are much further from the past pre-shock average price, i.e. 𝑃�−𝑖  
>𝑃� −𝑖𝑒 . After the shock individual price of player of type x is in line with equilibrium post-shock price, 
i.e. 𝑃�−𝑖  =3=𝑃∗. Difference between individual price and optimum is very low, in ideal simulated case (𝑃𝑖  –𝑃∗)=0. Similarly we would apply our considerations on player of type y. 
Thus, for the consistent behaviour it holds: 
Either if (𝑃�−𝑖  –𝑃� −𝑖𝑒 ) is high, then (𝑃𝑖  –𝑃∗) is low, which is the case of consistent rational player.
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Or if (𝑃�−𝑖  –𝑃� −𝑖𝑒 ) low, then (𝑃𝑖  –𝑃∗) is high, which is in line with consistent adaptive behaviour. 
As a result, such consistent behaviour is associated with the coefficient β<0. 
Following Figure 3 describes theoretical case of consistent and inconsistent behaviour of 
subjects at aggregate level. Illustrative case shows that consistent behaviour is present at aggregate 
level, where either the subject might be adaptive or rational, but still the consistency is reflected in 
their behaviour. On the x axis ideal case of consistent rational player is present (see black small 
point), whose expectations are further from equilibrium, according to simulations 𝑃�−𝑖 –𝑃� −𝑖𝑒  =12 on 
average, but the adjustment of individual price to equilibrium is perfect, where  𝑃𝑖   –𝑃∗=0. In contrast 
on y axis ideal case of consistent adaptive player is present, whose expectations are very close to the 
pre-shock price, where 𝑃�−𝑖 –𝑃� −𝑖𝑒  =0, but individual price is far from optimum, according to 
simulations where  𝑃𝑖   –𝑃∗=11 on average. Starting at the position of ideal rational player, the lower 
the expectation correction is, the higher the difference between individual and optimum price 
becomes. There is tendency to be less rational and more adaptive, for players, who emerge in this 
space. 
Figure 3: Consistent and Inconsistent Behaviour in the Economy 
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If we begin at the position of adaptive player, then the higher the expectation correction is, the 
lower the difference between individual and optimum price. This implies less inertial behaviour and 
tendency towards rational behaviour for players who emerge further from ideal case of adaptive 
player. Nevertheless, whether present closer to ideal case of adaptive or rational player, distribution of 
players depicted in Figure still respects consistency, where β<0. Right graph of Figure 3 depicts the 
situation, where rather inconsistency is present, since no relationship is present between the 
expectation correction and distance from equilibrium. Moreover, we may not distinguish between the 
swarm of adaptive and rational players so clearly. 
Presumptions Regarding Results 
In line with our initial hypothesis, we expect in case of uncertain nominal treatment (which is 
our experimental group) more players to be closer to the ideal situation of adaptive player. Thus, 
under the nominal frame weak coordination effort related to uncertainty will lead to the fact that 
subjects will be closer to left upward part of y axis, with expectation correction approaching to zero 
and higher distance from equilibrium, followed by implication at aggregate level. On the other hand, 
in the real treatment we expect more players present closer to the ideal situation of rational player, 
with intensive expectation correction and negligible distance from equilibrium. This should lead to the 
fact that majority of players will be close to the right downward part of x axis, whereas not many 
adaptive players will be present close to the y axis. However, common expected result for both 
treatments is that consistency should be reflected in incidence of players in line with β<0. 
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Results for the nominal treatment (NH Mgr) 
The model is significant at the 5% level, where the coefficient β is negative, which confirms 
that even in the nominal treatment, subjects proved to behave in consistent way (See Table 1 below). 
Based on results if the expected price level declines, the player will reduce his price.  
Table 1: Nominal treatment, (Experimental Group) 
 Coefficient t-value n R2 
constant 12.4859*** 18.2 
44 62.46% (𝑃�−𝑖 –𝑃� −𝑖𝑒 ) -0.833861*** -8.36 
Notes: (𝑷𝒊  –𝑷∗)�  = 12.48–-0.83*(𝑷�−𝒊  –𝑷� −𝒊𝒆 )  
***  Significance at the 1-percent level 
Additionally, if players do not correct their expectations at all, the coefficient β equals 12.48. 
In other words deviation from equilibrium is 12.48 is very close to the simulated case of adaptive 
player, for which the deviation from equilibrium in case of zero expectation correction is 11, (See 
Figure 4 below). 
Introduction of the nominal frame in this economy however proved to affect behaviour of 
players, where more of them corrected their expectations inappropriately compared to the real 
treatment and thus ended even at the upward left part of the graph, (i.e. their expectations about future 
post-shock development were even higher than the pre-shock average price). Nevertheless, the 
difference as opposed to the real treatment may be confirmed, where players do not correct their 
expectations in so intensive way like in the real treatment and are closer to behaviour of adaptive 
player. The same holds for distance from equilibrium as mentioned above. Despite that, still it is 
visible that trajectory reflects consistent direction, where points respect mostly negative slope of the 
curve, i.e. β<0.  
Figure 4: Difference from Optimum on Expectations Correction, the Nominal Treatment 
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other players will behave in adaptive way and thus adjust their behaviour accordingly in order to 
maximize rewards. Therefore the share of adaptive players is substantial. This has additional 
implications, since due to the majority of adaptive players prevailed under nominal treatment 
convergence to aggregate equilibrium is significantly decelerated. 
Results for the Real treatment (RH Mgr) 
Based on results in Table 2, the model is significant at the 5% level, where the coefficient β is 
negative, which implies individuals were consistent, because if expectation correction is present, price 
adjustment takes place. Moreover, Figure 5 below shows that players are found more frequently in 
sector closer to the case of rational player if compared with the economy of nominal treatment and 
difference from optimum is not so striking either.  
 
Table 2:  Real Treatment, (Control Group) 
 Coefficient t-value n R2 
constant 8.14424*** 9.13 
40 26% (𝑃�−𝑖 –𝑃� −𝑖𝑒 ) -0.477926*** -3.66 
Notes: (𝑷𝒊  –𝑷∗)�  = 8.14–-0.4779*(𝑷�−𝒊  –𝑷�  −𝒊𝒆 )  
***  Significance at the 1-percent level 
 
This is in accordance with our previous presumptions. In addition, it suggests that players in 
the real treatment corrected their expectations more frequently. If expectation correction is 
approaching to zero, which is ideal case of adaptive player, then deviation from optimum is 8.14, (See 
Figure 5).  However, only few players follow very closely ideal adaptive behaviour. In this case the 
channel of strategic complementarity under the real frame is substantially weaker, since subjects do 
not have any reason to believe that other subjects will behave in adaptive way, since no barrier related 
to converting of nominal values into the real ones is present. Thus, prevalence of rather weaker 
adaptive or even rational behaviour in this treatment implies that convergence to equilibrium is 
significantly faster, as was already demonstrated with help of ideal simulations. 
Figure 5: Difference from Optimum on Expectations Correction, the Real Treatment 
 
 
 
y = -0,4779x + 8,1442 
R 2  = 0,2603 
-5 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
-15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 
1st Annual International Interdisciplinary Conference, AIIC 2013, 24-26 April, Azores, Portugal               - Proceedings- 
672 
 
Conclusion 
This article aimed to evaluate whether subjects tend to adaptive rather than rational behavior 
under uncertain environment of nominal treatment, where subjects have to overcome barrier of 
nominal pay-offs. Our initial hypothesis was confirmed via experiment based on     n-player pricing 
game with monopolistic competition and strategic complementarity in vein of Fehr and Tyran (2001), 
where subjects cope with either nominal or real pay-offs. In order to provide appropriate grounds for 
experimental results gained, simulations were performed. Thus, results of our investigation are two-
folded. 
Firstly, simulations proved that individual behavior of both types of adaptive players in our 
experimental economy is associated with substantial backward-looking behavior, where only slow 
movement towards post-shock equilibrium is present. Additionally this adaptive behavior is 
associated with zero expectation correction and significant deviation from post-shock equilibrium at 
size of 11 on average. In contrast individual behavior of both types of rational players exhibits quick 
adjustment to equilibrium, where zero deviation in ideal case is present on average and substantial 
expectation correction is present after the shock at size of 12 on average. This is also reflected at 
aggregate level, where simulations suggest that even equal share of rational versus adaptive players in 
the economy is sufficient to converge smoothly to equilibrium. In contrast, simulated case of purely 
adaptive economy indicates slow convergence dependent on pre-shock average price of the economy. 
Secondly, experimental results proved our initial hypothesis. In case of nominal treatment, 
subjects tend to behave rather in adaptive way, since the size of expectation correction is close to 
simulated case of adaptive player together with substantial deviation from equilibrium. On the other 
hand, subjects in the real treatment behave in less adaptive and even rational way, where the size of 
expectation correction is far away from the case of adaptive player and deviation from equilibrium 
substantially smaller, in line with previous simulations. Prevalence of adaptive players under the 
nominal treatment has also implications in terms of slower convergence to equilibrium at aggregate 
level, as opposed to the real treatment where more rational players are present. This is also in line 
with our previous simulations, where the nominal treatment is closer to the situation of adaptive 
economy, whereas the real treatment is closer to the situation of the economy mixed of rational versus 
adaptive players. Additionally it was proved that subjects in both treatments behaved consistently. 
Results indicate that when subjects have to cope with uncertain nominal environment, they 
tend to switch to rule-guided (backward-looking) behavior of adaptive type, which is the best option 
in terms of costs minimization and as well in terms of strategic complementarity, where it is optimal 
to follow behavior of other players, although they behave in suboptimal way, since rewards may be 
maximized. In other words, it appears that rationality under uncertain environment of nominal values 
is more expensive, which has been revealed in comparison of the nominal versus real treatment and 
character of players prevailed. This is certainly reflected in the size of rewards gained by rational 
versus adaptive players, whose evaluation might be suggestion for future research. 
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